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Comment Michael M. Alba
Summary
Why are economic conditions—obviously beside the deﬁnitional divide
in incomes and living standards—so diﬀerent between rich and poor coun-
tries? In developing economies, why are inﬂation and tariﬀ rates higher,
property rights and the rule of law not well established, red tape rife, and
corruption endemic? Why are government-owned or controlled ﬁrms—
particularly banks—so ubiquitous, tax evasion so pervasive, and the tax
base so narrow? In contrast to the political economy literature, which
points to government capture by politically powerful groups as the source
of these perverse outcomes, Gordon and Li (2005a, 2005b) hypothesize
that the culprit is a developing-country government’s limited capability to
enforce tax laws, due, on the one hand, to informational and monitoring
constraints when ﬁrms transact business on a cash basis, thus leaving no
record, and, on the other hand, to the low and variable productivity gains
that ﬁrms obtain when using the ﬁnancial sector, thus providing them little
incentive to switch from the tax-evading informal sector to the tax-paying
formal sector. Accordingly, ﬁrms that cannot do without the ﬁnancial sec-
tor, such as the large or capital-intensive ones, are those that are most
highly taxed and that constitute the narrow tax base. In a second-order re-
sponse, the government then acts to reduce the burden on these ﬁrms by
providing tariﬀprotection, rationing credit, and subsidizing loans (thus ex-
plaining government ownership of banks); at the same time, it can increase
the costs of informal sector ﬁrms by using inﬂation as a tax on cash hold-
ings and by imposing red tape, regulatory barriers to entry, and other non-
tax costs. As an extreme measure, the government may even opt for con-
trol of capital-intensive ﬁrms to ensure that, although heavily taxed, these
ﬁrms continue to operate at the appropriate scale and capital intensity.
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that was especially instructive. Not having studied public economics, I learned much from the
exercise, including certain “tricks of the trade,” such as those involved in the formulations of
the social welfare function (i.e., equations [1a] and [1b]), the use of diﬀerent taxes to achieve
the same outcome, and the derivation of equations (3) and (6).To provide a point of comparison, Gordon and Li (2005a) also develop
a political economy model based on Grossman and Helpman (1994). In
this alternate paradigm, the perverse policies derive from the bargaining
process between (free of the free-rider problem) industries that bribe the
party in power and a government that maximizes a social welfare function
that is speciﬁed as a sum of the industry utilities and the overall beneﬁts of
government revenue net of spending. The equilibrium outcome is that the
degree of protection given to a particular industry depends on the value of
its bribe to the government relative to the harm favoring it has on general
welfare, including that of the other bribing industries. More speciﬁcally,
the model predicts that the optimal eﬀective tax rate for a bribing industry
will be negative, as long as the industry is subject to a capital tax or import
tariﬀs are levied on some industries, whereas that of a nonbribing industry
may be positive. Moreover, under certain conditions, the optimal eﬀective
tax rate will be lower in more capital-intensive industries if it is already 
subject to—and precisely to compensate for—a capital tax. On the other
hand, no plausible reason will be seen for using tariﬀs to protect bribing in-
dustries, unless diﬀerential sales tax rates cannot be imposed. Neither will
there be reasonable grounds, in general, for imposing a capital tax (or pro-
viding a capital subsidy) against levying an output tax (or reducing the
sales tax rate). But if the need exists, the superior policy, because it is more
sharply targeted, will be to subsidize loans for capital investments in these
industries, which may require government guarantees or state ownership
of banks.
Two key elements of this political economy model are (a) the constraint
on the social welfare function that a bribe by any industry will be accept-
able only if it allows the government and the other bribing industries to be
as well oﬀ as when the industry in question does not bribe and (b) the pro-
portion of the bribing industries. The constraint has the eﬀect, in equilib-
rium, of setting the utilities of the bribing industries to their default levels,
that is, the level of welfare that each industry would attain, had all the other
bribing industries submitted acceptable bribes. The proportion of bribing
industries, for its part, circumscribes the extent to which the government
can trade oﬀ the value of the bribe received with the harm favoring the in-
dustry does to the welfare of the society as a whole. Thus, because the brib-
ing industries are assured of their default utility levels, the higher the frac-
tion of the bribing industries, the less leeway the government has for making
tradeoﬀs.
Assuming that fewer industries have the resources to bribe the govern-
ment in developing countries, one may then draw out the following predic-
tions from the political economy model: For poor countries, (a) overall tax
revenue (as a proportion of output) and the size of the government will be
higher, and (b) there will be greater ﬂexibility to implement redistributive
tax measures, such as a progressive income tax structure.
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ernment to ensure that bribes are paid, which implies the poorest countries
will have more state-owned ﬁrms, since proportionately they will have the
fewest industries with a capacity to bribe. On the other hand, there are no
grounds for using inﬂation and red tape as policy measures.
To test the predictions of the two models against the empirical evidence,
Gordon and Li (2005a) put together a cross-section data set consisting of
125 countries. They ﬁnd that the empirical evidence is consistent with three
of the four forecasts that are similar between the two models, but only with
those of the Gordon-Li model among the forecasts that are dissimilar.
Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that poor countries apparently have higher capital
taxes as well as higher proportions of government-owned banks and other
enterprises,1 although in each case the data are not suﬃciently detailed to
distinguish the deeper, divergent motives of the two models. On the other
hand, the data show that poor countries have lower tax revenues (as a pro-
portion of GDP), higher tariﬀ revenues (as a proportion of government
revenues), lower income and sales tax revenues (as a percentage of tax rev-
enues), a higher inﬂation tax, more red tape, and larger informal sectors.
Critique
What can one make of these models and the empirical evidence? The
easy conclusion to draw is that the evidence is still quite tentative, because
the data are not detailed enough to allow more than general and suggestive
tests. Indeed, for this reason, some of the tests have a contrived feel. For in-
stance, the prediction that capital-income taxes will be levied in the politi-
cal economy model seems a bit forced, given that, under the framework,
the superior policy is to levy an output tax. A second example is in the ap-
propriation of the bribing industries as the informal sector, simply because
they have tax exempt status. Yet another example is in the use of the cost to
register a new business and the time required to start a business legally as
indicators not just of red tape per se, but of red tape intended for the in-
formal sector. Arguably, the majority of informal sector ﬁrms do not regis-
ter their businesses as this would only leave a paper trail for government in-
spectors to track. Indeed, either the respondents of the World Bank survey
from which the data were generated are unlikely to belong to the shadow
economy or the informal sector respondents are likely to be undersampled.
Perhaps more to the point, formal sector ﬁrms are just as likely to be
aﬀected by these time and ﬁnancial costs, unless there are fast lanes for
ﬁrms that are able to show tax payment certiﬁcates. On the other hand, in
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1. In the political economy model, a higher capital-income tax can be levied on the many
nonbribing industries to oﬀset capital subsidies to the fewer capital owners who bribe the gov-
ernment.the regression of the size of the informal economy, the log of per capita
GDP may have an error-in-variable problem, inasmuch as the measure-
ment of GDP does not cover the output of the informal sector, which is
likely to be proportionally more signiﬁcant in poorer countries. In other
words, the economic output is likely to be more undercounted in poor
countries, which tend to have proportionally larger informal sectors.
As for the models, a problem is that the political economy model that is
developed is not a good benchmark, because under no set of conditions
can it replicate certain stylized facts in developing economies, such as the
existence of an informal sector (unless it is made artiﬁcially equivalent to
the bribing industries that, as a consequence, pay no taxes) and red tape
and the use of inﬂation as a policy measure. A better alternative model is
one that can replicate all the perverse outcomes in developing countries
but under diﬀerent assumptions, for example, an economy mired in a low-
level equilibrium trap because either the political power of certain groups
is threatened by economic growth or a predatory state preys on, that is, ex-
torts and threatens—and is not just bribed by—the productive sector (see,
e.g., Hoﬀ and Stiglitz [2001]).
Another problem is that, in the two models, the extent of corruption is
circumscribed by the tradeoﬀ at the margin between the beneﬁts of gov-
ernment expenditures to the people and the beneﬁts of unspent revenue to
the government in the case of the Gordon-Li model and the value the gov-
ernment assigns to a bribe and the harm that policies favoring the bribing
industries can have on the general welfare in the case of the political econ-
omy model. Alas, in the developing countries, extortion rather than bribery
can be the order of the day, and predators or rivals are not always so well
meaning or morally squeamish. Indeed, the game can be played for keeps,
as in the following example from McCoy (1994, 429):
In June 1972, Eugenio Lopez, Sr., stood at the summit of Philippine
public life. Starting as a provincial bus operator, he had risen in only six-
teen years to become chairman of the country’s largest media conglom-
erate and president of its leading utility, the Manila Electric Company.
His brother was ﬁnishing a [second] term as vice-president of the Philip-
pines....  U s ing his formidable media assets, he had recently defeated
the country’s president, Ferdinand Marcos, in a bitter battle over the
spoils of power....  
Only three months later, President Marcos declared martial law and
destroyed Eugenio Lopez. After imprisoning his eldest son on capital
charges, Marcos forced Lopez to sign over his shares in the Manila Elec-
tric Company and had to watch silently while a presidential crony plun-
dered his media conglomerate. Forced into exile, stripped of his wealth,
and tortured by the threat of his son’s execution, Lopez died of cancer in
1975 in a San Francisco hospital.
It is diﬃcult to get at the ultimate reasons for taxation and inﬂation poli-
cies. But as far as government ownership of ﬁrms is concerned, the Philip-
40 Roger Gordon and Wei Lipines is a counterexample to the Gordon-Li model. In the late 1980s, the
country privatized the Philippine National Bank (PNB), then the largest
government-owned bank, and, in the late 1990s, it auctioned oﬀ Metro
Manila’s water distribution utility to two concessionaires. In the ﬁrst case,
it was because the bank’s ﬁnancial position had become unsustainable, in
large part due to its portfolio of bad loans mostly to Marcos cronies—
which is a dangerous possibility for the government in the Gordon-Li
model, if the highly taxed, capital-intensive ﬁrms become chummy with
government-owned banks. In the second case, it was because the Metro-
politan Waterworks and Sewerage System, a government-owned corpora-
tion, could not aﬀord the capital investments necessary to maintain the
quality of water distribution services. Since then the PNB’s ﬁnancial posi-
tion has improved, as has the quality of water distribution in Metro Manila.
In any case, if the Gordon-Li model is an accurate account of the per-
verse economic policies in developing countries, then the policy implica-
tion is to speed up the implementation of ﬁnancial sector reforms to raise
the marginal beneﬁts that ﬁrms gain from ﬁnancial intermediation. The
real danger, however, is that the model will be used by some rent-seeking
government to stop anticorruption initiatives on the argument that cor-
ruption will vanish anyway once the beneﬁts from using the ﬁnancial sec-
tor are obtained.
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